We study an extension of the Gale-Shapley marriage model and the ShapleyShubik assignment model by considering linear valuations and bounded side payments. Our model includes the Eriksson-Karlander hybrid model as a special case. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm which finds a pairwise-stable outcome.
Introduction
A two-sided matching market consists of two disjoint finite sets of agents. The purpose is to match the agents of opposite sides in pairs. A matching is a set of pairs of opposite sides such that each agent appears at most once and is called stable if there is no pair of agents who are not matched with each other but prefer each other to their partners in the matching.
The marriage model by Gale and Shapley [4] and the assignment model by Shapley and Shubik [10] are well known in the theory of two-sided markets. In [4] , Gale and Shapley proposed an algorithm that always finds a (perfect) stable matching for any instance of a stable marriage model problem. In their model, side payments are not allowed, i.e., the agents are rigid. In the assignment model by Shapley and Shubik [10] , in contrast to the Gale-Shapley marriage model, side payments are permitted, i.e., the agents are flexible, and they showed that the core is non-empty.
Kaneko [5] unified both the Gale-Shapley marriage model and the Shapley-Shubik assignment model, and proved the non-emptiness of the core, but does not consider lattice property. Roth and Sotomayor [9] proposed a general model that includes the both marriage and assignment model. They showed the existence of stable outcome and investigated the lattice property for payoffs in the core. The model of Eriksson and Karlander [1] deals with both rigid and flexible agents, which is a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models. The existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes are preserved in their model. Following the idea of Eriksson and Karlander [1] , Sotomayor [11] investigated their hybrid model and gave a non-constructive proof of the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome.
Very recently, Fujishige and Tamura [2] proposed a common generalization of the marriage model and the assignment model by utilizing the framework of discrete convex analysis which was developed by Murota [6, 7, 8] . Their model also includes hybrid models of Eriksson and Karlander [1] and Sotomayor [11] . The existence of a pairwisestable outcome is preserved in their model. They further extended their model in [3] by assuming possibly bounded side payments and proved the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome. In their work, however, structure of the set of pairwise-stable outcome is not discussed.
In the present work, our aim is to formulate a model which includes the Gale-Shapley marriage model, the Shapley-Shubik assignment model and the Eriksson-Karlander model as special cases. We use the notion of bounded side payments and valuations rather than rigidity and flexibility. We list here the main assumptions in our model:
• the set of agents is partitioned into two sets; the set of men and the set of women,
• each agent has at most one partner of opposite side,
• side payments are permitted,
• side payments are bounded by lower and upper bounds,
• valuations of agents for the side payments from opposite side are identified by linear and strictly increasing real valued functions.
We can handle rigid agents by assuming 0 as a lower and upper bound for the side payments and the flexible agents can be dealt by considering lower and upper bounds of the side payments sufficiently small and sufficiently large, respectively, and hence the marriage model, the assignment model and the Eriksson-Karlander hybrid model are included in our model. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm in the number of agents to find a pairwise-stable matching. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss our model and give a comparison between known models and our model. In Section 3, we characterize the pairwise stability. We will use this characterization to develop a polynomial-time algorithm. Section 4 deals with the case when valuations are linear. In this section, first of all, we give several lemmas which will help us to design our algorithm. We then propose our algorithm and finally discuss its correctness and complexity.
Model Description
Let M and W be two disjoint finite sets of agents and let E = M × W , i.e., the set of all pairs (i, j) of agents i ∈ M and j ∈ W . A subset X ⊆ E is called a matching if every agent appears at most once in X. Given a matching X, k ∈ M ∪ W is called unmatched in X if it does not appear in X; otherwise matched in X.
Before describing our model, we briefly explain the marriage model by Gale and Shapley [4] and the assignment model by Shapley and Shubik [10] . In the marriage model, M and W represent the sets of men and women, respectively. Each man has preferences on the women and each woman has preferences on the men. Negotiations and side payments are not involved in this model. We represent the preferences of men and women by the numbers a ij ∈ R and b ij ∈ R, respectively, for all (i, j) ∈ E. For i ∈ M and j 1 , j 2 ∈ W , if a ij 1 > a ij 2 then we say that i prefers j 1 to j 2 , and i is indifferent between j 1 and j 2 if a ij 1 = a ij 2 . Similarly, the preferences of women over men are defined by the vector {b ij | (i, j) ∈ E}. Here we assume that a ij > 0 if j is acceptable to i, and a ij = −µ otherwise, and b ij > 0 if i is acceptable to j, and b ij = −µ otherwise, where µ > 0 is a sufficiently large number. A matching X is called pairwise-stable if there exist q ∈ R M and r ∈ R W such that (m1) q i = a ij and r j = b ij for all (i, j) ∈ X, (m2) q ≥ 0, r ≥ 0, and q i = 0 (resp. r j = 0) if i (resp. j) is unmatched in X,
Gale and Shapley [4] presented an algorithm which finds a stable matching in this model.
In the assignment game, M and W represent the sets of sellers and buyers, respectively. The negotiation and side payments between agents of both sides are allowed. Naturally, each agent wants to gain as much profit as possible from his/her partner. Here a ij ∈ R and b ij ∈ R represent the profits of i and j, respectively, when i and j are matched. The preferences of sellers over buyers and of buyers over sellers can be defined similarly as in the marriage model. A matching X is called pairwise-stable if there exist q ∈ R M and r ∈ R W such that
Shapley and Shubik [10] showed the existence of a stable outcome in this assignment model. Now we describe our model. For each (i, j) ∈ E we denote by ν ij : R → R a valuation of agent i ∈ M for a side payment from j ∈ W to i, and by ν ji : R → R a valuation of agent j ∈ W for a side payment from i ∈ M to j. We assume that ν ij and ν ji are continuous and monotone increasing and that there exist the inverse functions ν −1 ij and ν −1 ji over R for all (i, j) ∈ E. We also assume that we are given vectors l, u ∈ R E with l ≤ u, where l ij and u ij ((i, j) ∈ E) denote the lower and upper bounds of a side payment from j ∈ W to i ∈ M .
We say that p = (p ij :
A pair (X, p) of a matching X and a feasible side payment vector p is said to be a pairwise-stable outcome if q ∈ R M and r ∈ R W defined by
Here q i and r j represent the payoffs for i ∈ M and j ∈ W , respectively. If there exist a pair (i, j) ∈ E and c ∈ [l ij , u ij ] such that q i < ν ij (c) and r j < ν ji (−c), then i and j had better change their current status or partners and make a partnership with each other. By defining the linear valuations as
we get the marriage model by Gale and Shapley [4] . If l = (−µ, . . . , −µ) and u = (+µ, . . . , +µ) for a sufficiently large µ > 0, then we have the assignment model by Shapley and Shubik [10] . We say that a matching X is pairwise-stable if there exists a feasible side payment vector p such that (X, p) is pairwise-stable.
Characterization of Pairwise-stability
In this section, we characterize pairwise-stability by considering a partition of the set E. We will utilize this characterization to develop our algorithm. Lemma 3.1. A matching X is pairwise-stable if and only if there exist a feasible side payment vector p and two subsets E M and E W of E such that, defining q and r by (2.1) and (2.2), (S'1) q ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0,
where we define the maximum over an empty set to be equal to 0.
Proof. (⇒) Let (X,p) be a pairwise-stable outcome. We define q and r by (2.1) and (2.2) with p =p. Let p be a vector defined by 3) and let E M and E W be defined by
Obviously, p is a feasible side payment vector. We will show that p, E M and E W satisfy (S'1)∼(S'5). Condition (S'1) holds by (S1). Conditions (S'2) and (S'3) are direct consequences of (3.4) . We also have (S'4) by (S2) and (3.4) . We next show (S'5). Assume (i, j) ∈ E M , that is, ν ij (p ij ) > q i . By (3.3) and the monotonicity of
By (S'4) we see (i, j) ∈ E M , and hence, ν −1 ij (q i ) ≥ l ij . Suppose p ij < u ij to the contrary. Thus, we have q i = ν ij (p ij ) by (3.3) . Since r j < ν ji (−p ij ) holds and ν ij and ν ji are monotone increasing, there exists a sufficiently small positive number ε such that l ij ≤ p ij + ε ≤ u ij , q i < ν ij (p ij + ε) and r j < ν ji (−(p ij + ε)). However, this contradicts (S2). Hence p ij = u ij for all (i, j) ∈ E \ E W .
(⇐) We assume that there exist p, E M and E W satisfying (S'1)∼(S'5). We will show that (X, p) is pairwise-stable. Obviously, (S1) holds from (S'1). Suppose to the contrary that (S2) does not hold, i.e., there exist (i, j) ∈ E and c ∈ [l ij , u ij ] such that q i < ν ij (c) and r j < ν ji (−c). By (S'2), if q i < ν ij (c) then either (Case 1) (i, j) ∈ E M or (Case 2) (i, j) ∈ E M and p ij < c. Similarly by (S'3), if r j < ν ji (−c) then either (Case 3) (i, j) ∈ E W or (Case 4) (i, j) ∈ E W and p ij > c. Trivially (Case 2) and (Case 4) are unsuited. By (S'4), both (Case 1) and (Case 3) do not hold. By (S'5), (Case 1) is irreconcilable to (Case 4), and (Case 2) irreconcilable to (Case 3). This is a contradiction. Hence we have (S2).
Linear Valuations
In this section, we deal with the case where for all (i, j) ∈ E, valuations ν ij and ν ji are linear, i.e., these are defined by
where α ij and α ji are given positive reals, and β ij and β ji are given reals. Our main purpose is to show that a pairwise-stable outcome, namely (X, p, E M , E W ) satisfying (S'1)∼(S'5), can be found in polynomial-time in the number of agents. First, we assume that a given (X, p, E M , E W ) satisfies (S'1), (S'3), (S'4), (S'5) and the following condition:
We note that if no unmatched man in X has any pair in
, where
One can easily find such a tuple (X, p, E M , E W ) as follows. Define p ∈ R E by
and define E M , E W by
8)
Obviously, p is a feasible side payment vector. By the definition of p, if ν ji (−p ij ) < 0 then p ij = l ij , and if p ij < u ij then ν ji (−p ij ) ≤ 0. These imply that E M and E W satisfy (S'4) and (S'5). To define a matching X, we considerq ∈ R M and E M ⊆ E M defined byq
for all i ∈ M , and
Recall that the maximum over an empty set is 0 by definition. We also define a set E M ⊆ E M as follows: (ln α ji − ln α ij ) among the matchings having (4.14) . (4.15) Since initially W = ∅, any matching satisfies (4.13). If there exists a matching satisfying (4.13) then one can easily find a matching X satisfying (4.13), (4.14) , and (4.15) by solving the maximum weight matching problem for a bipartite graph. For a matching X defined as above, define q and r by (2.1) and (2.2). Then q is nonnegative because of q ≥ 0, and r is nonnegative by (4.14) , and hence, (S'1) holds. Moreover, (wS'2) holds because ofq ≥ 0, and (S'3) holds because '5) and, in addition, (4.13)∼(4.15), where we assume that W is the set of all matched women in X. If (S'2) does not hold, then we modify (X, p, E M , E W ) preserving (S'1), (wS'2), (S'3)∼(S'5), and (4.13)∼(4.15). Since we initially put p as large as possible, we monotonically decrease p, and hence, preserve r ≥ 0 and ν ji (−p ij ) ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E M in our modification. Assume that there exists an unmatched man i 0 in X such that there is a pair
and assign weights w(e) to each arc e of D as follows: (4.18) By the definition of D, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that (i, j) ∈ R(i 0 )\X and (k, j) ∈ X. Then, we have ν ji (−p ij ) ≤ ν jk (−p kj ).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that (i, j) ∈ R(i 0 ) \ X and ν ji (−p ij ) > ν jk (−p kj ) for (k, j) ∈ X. Since (i, j) is reachable from i 0 , there exists a sequence S of pairs in E M :
Obviously, the symmetric difference X of S and X is a matching covering W , and X is strictly greater than X in the sense of (4.14). This, however, is a contradiction. Thus, the assertion holds.
We also have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. D has no negative cycle with respect to w.
Proof. Assume that D has a negative cycle C. By the definition of D, vertices corresponding to E M \ X and X alternately appear in C. We express C by a sequence of pairs of E M as
where (i h , j h ) ∈ E M \ X and (i h+1 , j h ) ∈ X for all h = 1, 2, . . . , s. By (4.17), the weight w(C) of C is calculated as
By the construction of D, the symmetric difference X of X and C, which is a matching in (M, W ; E M ), also satisfies (4.13) and (4.14). The assumption that w(C) < 0, however, implies that
which contradicts (4.15). Hence, D has no negative cycle.
By Lemma 4.2, we can consider the shortest distance d : E M → R ∪ {+∞} from i 0 to the other vertices in D with respect to w. For convenience, we denote the shortest distance of (i, j) ∈ E M by d (i,j) . We now decrease p with a parameter ε ≥ 0 as (4.19) Before discussing how to determine a parameter ε, we give two lemmas.
if it has an entering arc, then the arc is unique and leaves some vertex of X.
We next show that ν ij (p ij (ε)) = ν ik (p ik (ε)). If i = i 0 then the unique path from i 0 to (i 0 , j) is (i 0 , (i 0 , j)) and hence
and, without loss of generality, assume that
This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.4. Assume that (i, j) ∈ R(i 0 ), and that there exists (k, j) ∈ X. For a
, then the above inequality holds for all ε ≥ 0. The above inequality holds with equality if arc ((i, j), (k, j)) lies on a shortest path from i 0 to (k, j).
Proof. In the case where ν ji (−p ij ) < ν jk (−p kj ), the assertion obviously holds. In the other case, it follows from Lemma 4.1 that ν ji (−p ij ) = ν jk (−p kj ), i.e., (k, j) ∈ X∩R(i 0 ). Since d is the shortest distance with respect to w, we have
Hence, we have
). This completes the proof. (4.21) be the set of all matched women for the matching X. Our aim is to decrease p as (4.19) by a parameter ε ≥ 0. Note that ν ij and ν ji , for all (i, j) ∈ E are monotone increasing on R and ν ij (p ij ) > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E \ E 0 . For the time being, if we ignore the lower bound l of the side payment vector, then we have the following bounds on the values of ν ij (p ij ) and ν ji (−p ij ) for any (i, j) ∈ R(i 0 ):
Note that Lemma 4.1 guarantees the existence of suchp ij provided that (k, j) exists.
To decide parameter ε, we explicitly write the above here:
(Case 2) Let ε 2 ≥ 0 be the minimum for which
If such ε 2 does not exist, then put ε 2 = +∞.
(Case 3) Let ε 3 ≥ 0 be the minimum for which ν ij (p ij (ε 3 )) = 0 for some (i, j) ∈ R(i 0 ).
(Case 4) Let ε 4 ≥ 0 be the minimum for which p ij (ε 4 ) = l ij holds for some (i, j) ∈ R(i 0 ).
(Case 5) Let ε 5 ≥ 0 be the minimum for which ν ji (−p ij (ε 5 )) = ν jk (−p kj (ε 5 )) holds for some (i, j) ∈ R(i 0 ) \ X and (k, j) ∈ X \ R(i 0 ). If such ε 5 does not exist, then put ε 5 = +∞.
Since l ∈ R E , we have ε 4 ∈ R. Thus, ε determined by ε = min{ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 , ε 4 , ε 5 } (4.22)
is well-defined. It follows from ε ≤ ε 4 that p(ε) is a feasible side payment vector. Put p = p(ε). (4.23) Now, our algorithm is described as below.
Algorithm Stable Outcome
Step 0: Let W = ∅. Initially define (X, p, E M , E W ), E 0 and E M by (4.6), (4.7), (4.8) , (4.9) , (4.11) , and (4.13)∼(4.15).
Step 1: If no unmatched man in X has any pair in E M \ E 0 then stop.
Step 2: Let i 0 be an unmatched man in X such that there is a pair (i 0 , j) ∈ E M \ E 0 . Construct a directed graph D = ({i 0 } ∪ E M , A) and weight w by (4.11) , (4.16) and (4.17) . Calculate the shortest distances d of all vertices in D from i 0 , and ε andp by (4.22) and (4.23) .
nor exponentials in practice, because maximizing (i,j)∈X (ln α ji − ln α ij ) is equivalent to maximizing Π (i,j)∈X α ji α ij , and because exp (−d (i,j) ) in (4.19) can be expressed by products and divisions of α ij 's. It is well known that the maximum weight matching problem in a bipartite graph can be solved in O(n 3 ). Since the arcs in graph D have general weights (positive or negative) and D does not have negative cycles with respect to w, we utilize the Moore-Bellman-Ford Algorithm which finds the shortest distances in O(| E M | · |A|). Since each pair (i, j) ∈ E M \ X has at most one entering arc and one leaving arc in D, |A| is bounded by n 2 from above. Thus, the shortest distances can be calculated in O(n 4 ). By Lemma 4.7, we can easily derive the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.8. The complexity of Stable Outcome is O(n 7 ) where n denotes the number of agents.
